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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The

Supreme

Court

has

jurisdiction

to

hear

this

Appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 7 8-2-2(3)(j).

NATURE OF PROCEEDING

This is an Appeal from an Order Granting Summary Judgment for
the Defendants and a Judgment of Dismissal entered in the Third
1

District Court, by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, on August 8,
1990.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 31, 1990.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

1.

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining

that the Defendants Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers were
entitled to a conditional privilege under the Fair Report Statute,
Utah Code Ann. 45-2-3 (1953), as amended?

2.

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no

genuine issue of fact remained as to whether Mr. Robert Bowen or
the State actually stated the things relied upon by the Defendants
for their claim of privilege?

3.

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining

that the article was privileged under the Fair Comment Doctrine?

4.

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion by the Trial

Court to find that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the article was privileged under the Fair Comment Doctrine?

5.

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining

that the Defendants were privileged to repeat statements allegedly
made by one who is privileged or protected by sovereign immunity?
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6.

Was it a substantial abuse of discpetion to find that no

genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the statements
allegedly attributed to one who is privileged and protected by
sovereign immunity were actually made by tl^at party?

7. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in finding that
no cause of action was stated for invasion of privacy under both
the false light and unreasonable publicity doctrines of that cause
of action?

8.

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no

material or genuine

issue of

publication of the

information

fact existed as to whether the
in the article constitutes

an

unreasonable publicity of matters which ha^e no public value?

9.

Did the Trial Court err as a matted of law in finding that

a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
cannot be maintained?

10.

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no

genuine and material issue of fact existed as to whether the
Defendants intentionally or recklessly caused emotional distress
to the Plaintiff?
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11.

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no

genuine and material

issue of

fact exists as to whether the

Plaintiff could show actual malice on the part of the Defendants?

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann., Section 45-2-3 (1953) as amended, is the
central statute relied upon by the Defendants in this case.

In

addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment.
However, because this Statute and that Rule are too lengthy to set
out in full, they are included in tne addendum, pursuant to Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and 24(a)(6).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is on appeal from the Third District Court's Order
granting

Summary

Plaintiff,

Judgment

finding

that

for the Defendants
the

Defendants

and against the

Kristine

Messerly

and

Thomson Newspapers were entitled to a conditional privilege that
required a showing of actual malice in order to state a cause of
action for libel.

Accordingly, the Court found that no genuine

issue of fact existed as to whether actual malice existed and
dismissed the Plaintiff's cause of action thereby.

In addition,

the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's other causes of action for

4

invasion

of

privacy

and

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress.

This is a lawsuit against a reporter ar}d her newspaper for an
article

that

claimed

that

the

Plaintiff,

a

nurse, had

four

abortions, a romantic relationship with her employer, was guilty
of professional impropriety, and illegal drug use.

This article devastated the Plaintiff! personally, mentally,
and professionally.
5,

1986

against

She commenced this action as a result on May

the state, the newspaper, and

Extensive discovery was carried out.

the reporter.

Eventually, the Defendants,

Thomson Newspaper and Kristine Messerly, filed a motion for summary
judgment for all causes of action.

A hearing was held before the

Honorable Judge Richard H. Moffat on the defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment on Friday, April 27, 1990.

The Court took the

matter under advisement and issued a Minut^ Entry on May 1, 1990.
The Court thereupon entered a Judgment oij Dismissal, finding no
cause of action against the Defendants and dismissing the claims
as to all Defendants (Thomson Newspapers and Kristine Messerly),
and awarded the Defendants costs in the aniount of $2,005.00.

An Objection was filed to the award oif costs, which the Court
denied, and the judgment and order was entered on August 8, 1990
at 8:07 a.m., Judgment No. 2158714. The Nptice of Appeal was filed
on 31st day of August, 1990.
5

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Order granting Summary
Judgment, and Judgment in her favor as a matter of law, or failing
that a remand for an actual trial on the matter.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

I.

Background of the Case

This case has arisen out of defamatory statements published
by Kristine Messerly and the newspaper known as The Daily Spectrum
(Thomson

Newspapers).

The

Defendants

falsely,

foundation, recklessly, and with malice, printed

without

any

a number of

defamatory statements about the Plaintiff, including statements
that

she

had

several

abortions, and

illegally given prescription drugs.

she was

improperly

and

The Defendants claimed that

they made these statements as quotes from a government official.
However, discovery had shown that this government official, Mr.
Robert Bowen, denied ever making the statements made in the story,
and he had no reasonable or logical basis for making them.

In

fact, it appears that the claims regarding abortions were created
out of whole cloth by the Defendants to both enhance their story
and to carry out a hidden vendetta against Dr. Brown by Kristine
Messerly.

6

The

Daily

unsupported

Spectrum's

claims

and

about

Kristine |Messerly's

numerous

abortions,

false

and

professional

impropriety, and drug use had an obvious and devastating effect on
Ms. Russell's professional and personal reputation in the small
community of Cedar City.

They were completely false statements!, but they exposed the
Plaintiff to hostility and enmity that claims of drug use, and
affair, and an abortion can bring in a small community like Cedar
City. Ms. Russell is not a public figure, but her whole reputation
has been brutally, cruelly and unfairly thrust into the public
limelight by this vindictive, reckless and groundless story.

The

story is a classic example of a newspaper destroying a person in
its pursuit of a "good story," a pursuit that maliciously used or
made up vicious innuendo and rumor when it was presented with the
opportunity to do so.
was

actuated

by

Indeed, it may be concluded that this story

malice

against

Dr.

Bfrown

and

a

heartless

malevolence against Ms. Russell.

Shelly Russell is a nurse who once forked for Dr. David W.
Brown.

The Division of Registration of the State of Utah began an

investigation of Dr. David Brown regarding his practice as a
physician,

as

Subsequently,

well
two

as

an

Petitions

investigation
were

filed

of
by

Shelly
the

Russell.

Division

of

Registration to have both Dr. Brown and Shelly Russell's licenses
revoked.

However, after the investigations, the State agreed to
7

another confidential settlement with Dr. Brown, and agreed to
another Stipulation with Ms. Russell in which the State agreed to
drop the Petition and all the allegations against Ms. Russell. As
a part of both of these Stipulations, the State agreed not to
reveal the results of the investigation, to close and seal the
file, and to not make any comments regarding this case.

Months

after

the

Stipulation

was

entered,

an

anonymous

informant called the Defendant known as The Daily Spectrum (Thomson
Newspapers) and stated that "some disciplinary action had been
taken against Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell."

Kristine Messerly

contacted the Division of Registration, and reached an unnamed
woman, who read to Ms. Messerly the entire Stipulation of Dr.
Brown.

Later, Ms. Messerly spoke with Mr. Robert Bowen.

Mr.

Robert Bowen, Director of the Division of Registration, read the
Stipulation,

Order

and

Petition,

but

investigative files were confidential.

he

indicated

that

the

However, Mr. Robert Bowen

was asked further questions by Ms. Messerly, to which he responded
in

spite

of

the

confidentiality

requirement.

During

these

additional questions, Mr. Robert Bowen repeated the unsubstantiated
rumor that Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown had a romantic relationship,
and there were discussions regarding dilation and curettage, among
other matters.

On December 11, 1985, the defamatory story was published in
The Daily Spectrum.

It attacked Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown with
8

false, incorrect, and unsubstantiated clainfis about improper drug
use, professional impropriety and abortion^.

In particular, the

article makes the false claim that Dr. Brown performed four (4)
abortions on Ms. Russell, when in fact no abortions have ever been
performed

on

Ms.

Russell.

Most

specifically,

the

article

incorrectly quotes Mr. Robert Bowen as stating the following about
dilation and curettage: "It's for abortion.1"

Mr. Robert Bowen, a representative of the State, denies making
such a statement.

In fact, he denies that he even knew what

dilation and curettage was, as he is not a physician. Furthermore,
Mr. Robert Bowen stated that Ms. Messerly had suggested

that

"dilation and curettage were performed for Abortions" to which Mr.
Bowen stated he did not know.

In addition, Dr. Brown has denied

that he has ever performed an abortion, thajt he is morally opposed
to abortion.

Furthermore, Ms. Messerly h^s claimed that she did

not believe that the statement was true when it was supposedly made
by Mr. Robert Bowen.

Finally, the storyj reviews at length the

Petition of charges made against Dr. Brown ana has mischaracterized
the Petition as "the record."

It recit[es the unsubstantiated

charges as if they had been proven, and they deceptively suggested
that Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell had admitted to the allegations.
No where does the story make any effort to jpoint out that Dr. Brown
and Ms. Russell had denied all the allegations, and the Division
had not presented any evidence in support (of the allegations.

9

Because of this defamatory article, Dr. Brown and his wife,
represented by different counsel, sued Thomson Newspapers, Kristine
Messerly, and the State of Utah citing libel, invasion of privacy,
breach of the non-disclosure provisions of the Stipulation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In addition, Shelly

Russell, represented by B. Ray Zoll, sued Thomson Newspapers, the
State of Utah, and Kristine Messerly for similar causes of actions.
Judge Moffat has dismissed the case against the State of Utah based
upon grounds of sovereign immunity.

II.

Facts to which a Material and Genuine Dispute Exists

This Appeal is somewhat in the form of a response to a Motion
for Summary Judgment.

As the Court is aware, on an appeal from an

Order granting Summary Judgment, the Appellant is entitled to have
his facts viewed in the best possible light. In order to highlight
and make the Court's investigation of the facts more efficient, the
Appellant is going to set out the relevant, material, and disputed
facts in separately numbered paragraphs with reference to the
depositions, exhibits, and other sources to which they are based.
In addition, the actual article which is at the center of this
dispute is attached as Exhibit '" 1" in the addendum to this Appeal.

1. The Utah Division of Registration investigated Ms. Russell
and Dr. Brown, and it attempted to have their licenses revoked.
However, after their investigations, the State agreed to drop the
10

Petition and all the allegations if Ms. Russell merely agreed to
random drug-testing for a year.

In addition, it must be pointed

out that Ms. Russell has never admitted to any wrongdoing, and the
State agreed to Ms. Russell's position in that regard.

After the

year of probation, the Petition against Ms. Russell was dismissed
with prejudice.
and

they

have

investigations.
and

Stipulation

The allegations of wrongdoing were never proven,
never

been

pursued

even

after

extensive

That is an undisputed fact. (See Petition, Order
between

Shelly

Russell

and

the

Division

of

Registration).

2.

Months after the Stipulation was entered, an anonymous

informant

called

The

Daily

Spectrum

and

stated

that

"some

disciplinary action had been taken against Dr. Brown and Ms.
Russell."
Russell.

In fact, no disciplinary action was taken against Ms.
(Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 61-63);

(See

also Petition, Order and Stipulation between Shelly Russell and The
Division of Registration).

3. Kristine Messerly volunteered to pursue this story, having
a personal acquaintance with Dr. Brown, there apparently being some
bad-blood between her mother and Dr. Brown.

(Messerly deposition,

Vol. I at page 65).

4.

Kristine Messerly contacted the Office of the Division of

Registration, but she was unable to reach Mr. Bowen, who was then
11

the Director of the Division.

(Messerly deposition, Volume I at

Page 86) .

5.

Ms. Messerly did reach an unnamed woman, apparently Mr.

Bowen's secretary, who read to Ms. Messerly the entire Stipulation
of Dr. Brown, including the provision that required the Division
to

simply

refer

third-parties

to

the

Stipulation, Order

and

Petition. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at page 108).

6.

Ms. Messerly later spoke to Mr. Bowen.

He also read the

Stipulation, Order and Petition to her over the phone, and he
indicated that the investigative files were confidential. However,
Mr. Bowen was asked further questions by Ms. Messerly, to which he
responded. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 113-125).

7.

Mr. Bowen spoke to Ms. Messerly about the investigation,

statistics of physicians in general, similar investigations, as
well as side matters. In particular, Mr. Bowen apparently repeated
the untrue rumor that Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown had a romantic
relationship. (Messerly deposition, Volume II at page 41).

8.

On December 11, 1985, the defamatory story was published

in The Daily Spectrum.

It attacked Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown with

false and unsubstantiated claims of improper drug use, romantic
liaisons, professional

impropriety, and abortions, as well as

inaccurate claims of substantiation.
12

It was highly vindictive.

In particular, the article makes the unsubstantiated claim that Dr.
Brown performed four (4) abortions on Ms. [Russell.
abortions have been performed on Ms. Russell.

In fact, no

(Brown deposition,

Volume III at page 109). (See Also Article attached as Exhibit "1"
in the addendum).

9.

In addition, the articles quotes tyr. Bowen at saying:
When asked what that procedure was "dilation
and curettage", Bowen said "its for abortion."

(See Article attached as See Exhibit I" 1" in the addendum to
Appellant's Brief).

10.

Mr. Bowen denies making such a statement.

In fact, he

denies that he even knew what dilation and curettage was, as he is
not a physician. (Bowen deposition at page 57).

11.

Furthermore, Ms. Messerly herself has stated that she

allegedly did not believe that the statement was true when it was
made.

However, she made it anyway, withbut any qualification.

(Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 17/-178).

12.

In addition, Dr. Brown has denied that he has ever

performed an abortion and that he is morally opposed to abortions.
(Brown deposition, Volume III at page 109)1.
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13.

Finally, the story reviews at length the Petition of

charges made against Dr. Brown.
as "the record."

It mischaracterizes the Petition

It recites unsubstantiated charges as if they

had been proven, and it deceptively suggests that Dr. Brown had
admitted to the allegations.

Nowhere does the story make any

effort to point out that Dr. Brown had denied all the allegations
and that the Division had not presented any evidence in support of
its allegations.

It, with malice, used the dismissed Petition as

some sort of authoritative findings by a Court in order to malign
the name of a prominent Cedar City physician whom the reporter had
a vendetta against.

(See Petition against Dr. Brown and the

Stipulation and Order).

14.
abortions

The article's claim that Ms. Russell
performed

on

her

is defamatory

on

had

its

four

face.

(4)
The

article's continued reference to the Petition's charges as if they
were

authoritative

statements

of

facts,

including

the

unsubstantiated and dismissed allegations of improper drug use are
defamatory on their face. (See Article attached as Exhibit "1" in
the addendum of this Appeal Brief).

15.

The Respondents' article was written with negligence,

implied malice and actual malice.

Specifically, the story was

written in order to malign the character and reputation of Dr.
Brown and Ms. Russell.

(See Article attached as Exhibit "1" in the

addendum to this Appeal Brief).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

The

defendants

are

not

entitled

to

a

conditional

privilege that would require actual malice fto maintain a cause of
action for libel. Defendants have not established the elements of
Utah Code section 45-2-3.

In addition, the state denies making the

statements relied upon by the defendants.

2.

The defendants cannot claim a conditional privilege under

the Fair Comment Doctrine.

None of the issues involved in this

case are of public interest, nor are they comments, but rather
statements of private facts, that turned out to be false.

3.

The defendants are not entitled to repeat statements'from

one who is privileged to state them.

4.

The Plaintiff has established evidence of actual malice

through the testimony of Kristine Messerly.

5.

The Plaintiff has established the elements necessary

under both the false lights and unreasonable publicity doctrines.
It compensates the individuals right to be let alone, unlike
defamation which compensates for the individual's damage to her
reputation.

15

6.

The Plaintiff has established evidence of conduct and the

aggravating circumstances that are required for the cause of action
for outrageous conduct.

7.

In a summary judgment, the non-moving party is entitled

to have her facts viewed in the best possible light,

ARGUMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment essentially states
that the Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers were entitled to
a conditional privilege to say the things they said in the article,
and that actual malice is required to be shown before a cause of
action for defamation will stand.
no

evidence

of

actual malice

The defendants next claim that

has been

shown

and

that

as a

consequence, the plaintiff's case should be dismissed.

The Plaintiff's basic response to these claims is two fold:
First, the defendants' are not entitled any conditional privileges
under any of the various theories proffered by the Defendants'
memorandum, either as a matter of law or according to the facts.
Second, the Plaintiff has demonstrated evidence of actual malice
on the defendants' part.

16

The defendants' have imaginatively relied on three different
theories in support of their claim of a conditional privilege:
(1) The article is privileged as a fair and true report
of a judicial, legislative, or other public official
proceeding, or of anything said ijn the course thereof.
(2) The article is fair comment, without malice, of a
matter of public interest.
(3) The defendants' are merely repeating supposed
privileged statements made by government officials, and
that they should therefore be privileged to repeat them.

The Plaintiff's

shall explain

the

law on each of these

privileges and show that they do not apply. However, the Plaintiff
shall first state the proper standard for proving defamation in a
case not involving a public individual.

II. NO PRIVILEGE APPLIES UNDER THE FAIR REPORT STATUTE

A. PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ARE ONLY REQUIRED TO SHOW NEGLIGENCE.
The 1981 Utah case of Seegmiller v. KSfr, Inc. authoritatively
stated the appropriate standard of proof f0r private individuals:
We conclude that it would be inappropriate to
strike the balance in favor of an actual
malice test, thereby relieving the media from
acting with due care and permitting it to
inflict uncompensable
injury on private
individuals,
irrespective
of
negligent
conduct. In our view a negligence test best
accommodates the competing interests. The duty
of the press to act with reasonable care
towards private individuals is not unduly
burdensome
and
should
not
result
in
inappropriate self-censorship. S|cJociety has no
interest in the dissemination Of statements
which are false and which couJ.d have been
17

prevented through the exercise of reasonable
care. The standard of due care requires only
that the media personnel act as reasonably
prudent persons in the industry would act to
ascertain the truth.
626 P.2d 968, 974 (Utah 1981).

In this case, it is clear that Ms. Russell is not a public
figure by any stretch of the imagination.
Russell has not thrust herself

Specifically, Shelley

in the forefront of a public

controversy to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
Nor has she sought the public's attention through the notoriety
of her achievements.

These are the standards required to classify

a plaintiff as a public figure.

See Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626

P.2d 968, 974 (Utah 1981) quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323,342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 3009, 41 LEd.2d 789 (1974)

Consequently, the Plaintiff normally would only have to show
that Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers failed to act with
due care.
facts

However, the defendants have attempted to squeeze these

alternatively

privileges.

into

three

(3) qualified

or

conditional

The Plaintiff will show that none of these even

remotely applies.

In addition, the Plaintiff must point out that

the defendants have the burden of proof in showing that they fit
in these dubious privileges.

Furthermore, these privileges apply

only to certain fact situations which are controverted by the
Plaintiff and by sworn testimony.

18

B.

PRIVILEGE: THE TRUE AND FAIR REPORT OF A PROCEEDING

Utah has enacted

statutory

provisions which

provide for privileged publication.

specifically

They are found in Utah Code

Annotated 45-2-3, as amended in 1975. This section is dispositive,
so the Plaintiff shall quote it in its entirety:
45-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast defined.
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be
considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made:
(1) In the proper discharge of an official
duty.
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any
statement made in any legislative or judicial
proceeding,
or
in
any
oth^r
official
proceeding authorized by law.
(3)
In a communication, without malice, to
a person interested therein, by one who is
also interested, or by one who stlands in such
a relation to the person interested as to
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the
motive for the communication innocent, or who
is requested by the person interested to give
the information.
(4) By a fair and true report, without
malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other
public official proceeding, or of anything
said in the course thereof, or of a charge or
complaint made by any person to a public
official, upon which a warrant shall have been
issued or an arrest made.
(5) By a fair and true report, without
malice, of the proceedings of a public
meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened
for a lawful purpose and open to the public,
or the publication or broadcast <i>f the matter
complained of was for the public benefit.
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The defendants are specifically relying upon Section 45-23(4) to provide them a privilege to state the things they stated
in the article.

In addition, the defendants rely heavily on

obscure case law culled from scattered states from around the
country that deal with the so-called "fair reports privilege." Its
memorandum completely ignores the statutory language of U.C.A. 4 52-3-(4).

It would be helpful to break-down what elements are

required to satisfy statute.

These elements must be proven by the

defendants to use the privilege:
(1)

The article must be "true and fair."

(2)

The article must be of a judicial, legislative, or
other public official proceeding, or

(3)

The article must be of anything said in the course
of the public, official, proceeding, or

(4)

The article must be of a charge or complaint made
by any person to a public official, upon which a
warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made.

It is clear that the defendants' memorandum fails to deal
adequately with any of the these four elements.

The defendants'

essential argument is that they were simply repeating what the
Petition before the Division of Registration stated and what Mr.
Bowen stated.

This claim is flawed in a number of ways, any of

which causes the defendant to fail to qualify under the privilege.

First, the petition freely quoted by the defendants is simply
a charge or a complaint.
adjudication.

It is not a proceeding.

It is not an

It is simply a charge by an authority tasked to
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charge individuals.

In order for the repetition of a charge or

complaint to be privileged, it must be a charge or complaint upon
which "a warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made."
U.C.A. 45-2-3(4).

See

In this case, no warrant could have been issued

or an arrest made based upon the Division's Petition.
any reliance upon the statute is misplaced.

Therefore,

The reason for this

provision is obvious: it is to protect innocent individuals from
being victimized by unproven charges.

The defendants made use of

petition as if they were proven charges.

The plaintiff was tried

and convicted based simply upon the allegations made against a
third-party, and

suffered

accordingly.

Both

justice and the

language of the statute refuse to permit the defendants to hide
behind a conditional privilege in such circumstances.

Second, there was no "public" proceeding.

U.C.A. 45-2-3(4)

and the Restatement 2d of Torts Section 611 both require that there
be

an official

sufficient

proceeding

or

a public

meeting.

It

is not

that there be an official proceeding, the statute

clearly requires that it also be public.

In the present case, there was no such proceeding.

There was

preliminary investigation by the state into Dr. Brown's activities,
and there were subsequent negotiations between the state and Dr.
Brown and his counsel relative to the drafting of the Stipulation
and Order.

Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation specifically states

that "no hearing will be held."
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Third,

the

statements

allegedly made

by Mr. Bowen

as a

commentary on the petition were not said in the course of the
proceeding. The statements were made after the parties had entered
into stipulations and the petitions were dropped by the Division
of

Registration.

proceedings.

They

were

statements

made

outside

of

any

The statement claimed by the defense to have been

made by Mr. Bowen (he categorically denies making it) were not part
of any public official proceeding.

The matter had been closed.

All statements attributed to Mr. Bowen were certainly not in the
course of a proceeding.

Fourth, the statute requires the report to be a true and fair
report of the proceeding.
true nor fair.

In this case, the article was neither

It was certainly not fair.

It simply repeated the

unproven and unsubstantiated allegations of the petition after it
had been dismissed.

The whole tenor of the story was to smear and

assassinate the characters of Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell with no
concern for the truth, no concern for Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell's
side of the story, no concern for the fact that the Division had
not proven one allegation found in the petition, and no concern for
the effects that repeating these allegations would have on the
reputations of these individuals.

The entire slant of the article

is to authoritatively claim that Dr. Brown and Shelley Russell had
done all these things stated in the petition.

The average reader

would certainly assume that all the things claimed in the petition
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were proven, particularly because of the language used by Ms.
Messerly.

However, an informed reader would be shocked at the

cavalier manner in which the article uses unproven allegations, how
it bases an article that may well destroy the professional career
and reputation of two individuals solely on a complaint.

It was

a story premised on the idea that Dr. Brov^n and Ms. Russell were
guilty until proven innocent.

That is not a fair report.

Subtle examples of unfairness and untruthfulness are found
throughout the article.

Ms. Messerly has testified to a clear

understanding of the difference between "allegations" and "facts."
(Messerly Deposition, Vol. 1 at Page 54). She testified that Mr.
Bowen made it very clear that the matters set forth in the petition
are allegations only, and not facts.
II. at Page 120).

(Messerly Deposition, Vol.

Despite this warning and her understanding of

it, the article describes Dr. Brown's and Ms. Russell's conduct
in a disparaging manner several times, without stating that it was
only alleged.

The headlines read "State Sanctions Cedar Doctor"-

-"Unacceptable Medical Practices."
Brown's

conduct

as

"improper

The article characterized Dr.
behavior^"

"misconduct,"

and

"wrongdoings." None of those are clarified by the explanation that
the claims were only allegations.

The article states that Dr.

Brown's administration of drugs to Ms. Russell was "addictive" when
the phrase given to Ms. Messerly actually stated

"potentially

addictive." The article says that Brown's files are "an open book"
even

though

Ms.

Messerly's

understanding
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was

that

only

the

Petition, Stipulation and Order could be disclosed.

Ms. Messerly

had no explanation as to why these inaccuracies appeared in the
story. (Messerly Deposition, Vol. II at page 50.)

The trier of

fact is entitled to consider the article as a whole in determining
its defamatory effect and thus, even though much of the article is
a direct quote from Mr. Bowen, the decision as to the effect of the
article in total, rests with the trier of fact.
Publishing Co. , 427 P.2d 79 (Hawaii 1967).

Taqawa v. Maui

Also, any headline,

heading or other libelous remarks or comments added or interpolated
in a report if not spoken by the Plaintiff or during a proceeding,
are not privileged.

Ilsley v. Sentinel Co. 113 N.W. 425, 155 ALR

1355 (Wis. 1907).

One of the most difficult aspects of Ms. Messerly's conduct
as taken from the depositions is her assertion that she is highly
motivated by "fairness" and "balance."
I at pages 40 and 49).
deadlines.

(Messerly Deposition, Vol.

She discusses the details concerning

(Messerly Deposition, Vol. I at pages 36-37).

She

states that in the interest of fairness in every case she tries to
contact the party the story is targeted at. She indicates that she
has varying discretion on deadlines.

She states that there was no

announced or imposed deadline in this case. And finally she states
that she made two efforts to contact Dr. Brown during the 1 and
1//2

days during which she made her investigation.

(Messerly

Deposition, Vol. I at pages 39-40; Vol. I at page 37; Vol. II at
page 106; and Vol. II at pages 24-27, respectively).
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Despite this

stated commitment to giving all sides the opportunity to provide
input, she failed to talk to Dr. Brown or Ms. Russell prior to
publication of the story.

Had she done so, she would have known

that no abortions were performed, no romantic relationship existed,
no professional impropriety had taken plac£, and no illegal drug
use had taken place.

And most critically, it was not a trud report.
accurately state what Mr. Bowen had said.

It failed to

He denies making the

statement that Ms. Messerly attributes to him.

There can be no

other conclusion other than that defendants are not entitled to
claim a privilege for things the State nevqr said.

Even assuming that Mr. Bowen said the procedures were for
abortion (although this is specifically and earnestly rejected by
Mr. Bowen), the privilege would not apply.

However, the defendant

is attempting to rely on obscure case-law in other states for the
proposition that the "fair report" privilege extends to verbal
statements of officials to news reporters.

This reliance is

misplaced both because the case relied upon is contrary to the
specific statutory language of U.C.A. 45-^-3(4) and because Mr.
Bowen's statements, if he made them, were outside the scope of his
duties.

Specifically, Mr. Bowen stipulate^ that he would respond

to inquiries from third-parties as followss
The Division and Brown stipulate that the
Division, Brown and all employees, agents and
representatives of the Division and Brown,
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shall respond to any questions by third
parties concerning the final resolution of
this matter by reference to the following
statement:
The Division's investigation of the
practice of Dr. Brown has been
completed. A stipulation resolving
the Division's Amended Petition has
been executed. No hearing will be
conducted. Copies of the Division's
Amended
Petition,
and
the
Stipulation and Order in this matter
are
located
at the Division's
Office.
(See paragraph 12 of the Stipulation and Order dated November 13,
1985) .

This paragraph

is determinative of both the question of

whether the statements were made in the course of the proceeding
and whether it was within the proper scope of Mr. Bowen's official
duties to make any comments about the case.

Clearly, Mr. Bowen

was not authorized to make any such statement, other than the
above paragraph.

The defense goes on at some length about a New Jersey case
that found the "Fair Reports" privilege applied to oral statements
made to reporters by officials.

However, the case does not

involve the interpretation of the Utah statute, nor does its facts
help much

in that

regard.

In fact, the Utah Supreme Court

authoritatively rejected this argument in the case of Seegmiller
v. KSL, Inc. , and it determined that the fair report privilege did
not extend beyond the language of the statute:
26

To extend the concept of a qualified privilege
to mere allegations of criminal conduct is
impermissible for two reasons. first, since
Section 45-2-3(4) limited the privilege to
actual, official charges of criminal conduct,
there is a clear implication that mere
allegations
of
conduct which might
be
violative of the criminal law should not be
construed to fall within the privilege. Bysetting the boundaries as it did, the
legislature
must
have
intended
that
allegations of criminal conduct not buttressed
by official action should not be included
within the privilege.
Nor could the strictness of the above
provisions be avoided by invoking the "public
benefit" qualified privilege provided in
Section 45—2-3(5)....
To so construe them
would simply set at naught the limitations the
legislature
imposed
on
the
privilege
established for official charges upon which a
warrant has been issued or an arrest made,
(emphasis added).
In addition, the defense has improperly quoted

(in their

summary judgment memorandum), the United States Supreme Court case
of Barr v. Mateo for support of the proposition that the "Fair
Reports" doctrine applies to oral communications of officials to
new reporters.

In fact, the case did not deal at all with the

"Fair Reports" doctrine.

Instead, it dealt with the privilege of

Federal officials to make statements "within the outer perimeter"
of their duties.

360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).

The defendants have not satisfied the statutory requirements
to claim a conditional privilege.
3(4) have not been met.

The elements of U.C.A. 45-2-

The article reported charges upon which

an arrest warrant shall not have been issu0d.
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It claims to have

repeated

statements made by Mr. Bowen.

However, Mr. Bowen's

alleged statements were not made "in the course of a proceeding,M
nor were they proper within the scope of his authorized duties,
since he had contracted and was ordered by a court not to make any
statements regarding the case. Finally, the report is neither true
nor

fair.

established

It repeats

unproven

allegations

facts, and

it attributes

as

if

a statement

they were
to a state

official that he never made, nor would he have the knowledge to
make such a statement.

The defendants have failed to prove the elements required for
the Utah conditional privileges.

In the end, however, they must

still prove that Mr. Bowen made the statements about abortion.
has stated under oath that he never made them.

He

A genuine dispute

of material fact remains on that issue and summary judgment must
accordingly be denied.

It is clear that one cannot be privileged

to repeat a statement never made by the government.

III. FAIR COMMENT ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST
The defendants are attempting to claim that the article is a
"fair comment on a matter of public interest."

The defendants'

memorandum gives a general statement of the doctrine.
principally dealt with

in four Utah cases.

The

Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub. Co., 27 P.2d
introduced

the doctrine

to Utah.

It held

It is

first case,

1 (Utah 1933),

that

a qualified

privilege existed for a newspaper to comment and give opinions on
28

the management of the water supply system after an epidemic of
typhoid fever occurred.

The court stated the issue as follows:

If not true, was the publication made in good
faith, without actual malice, and with
reasonable or probable grounds for believing
it to be true?
Were the comments and
criticisms
contained
in the publication
declared on concerning the manner in which
respondent conducted the waterworks system,
and how he should be dealt with because of his
conduct in such respect, reasonable and fair,
in the light of the facts and circumstances
that existed or appeared to exist at the time
such comments and criticisms were published.
See Williams, 27 P.2d at 14.

In addition, the case relies heavily upon Newell on Slander
and

Libel,

(4th

ed.), and

quotes

extensively

from

particular, it quotes Section 481, which spates:
1. Criticism deals only with such things as
invite public attention or call for public
comment. It does not follow a public man into
his private life or pry into his domestic
concerns.
It also quotes from Section 483, which stages:
Criticism and comment on well-known or
admitted facts are very different things from
the assertion of unsubstantiated facts.
A
fair and bona fide comment on a matter of
public interest is an excuse of what would
otherwise be a defamatory publication.
The
statement of this rule assumes the matter of
fact commented upon to be somehow ascertained.
It does not mean that a man may invent facts,
and comment on the facts so invented in what
would be a fair and bona fide manner on the
supposition that the facts were true. If the
facts as a comment upon which the publication
is sought to be excused do not exist, the
foundation fails.... It is one thing to
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it.

In

comment upon or criticize, even with severity,
the acknowledged or proved acts of a public
man, and quite another to assert that he has
been guilty of particular acts of misconduct.
To state matters which are libelous is not
comment or criticism.
(emphasis added)

A second case is Oqden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc. 551 P.2d 222
(Utah 1976).

It held that it was proper to comment that the

Plaintiff "was lax" in its operation of the bus line.

This was

held to be a comment on a matter of public interest, namely the
school system, which was using the bus line as a contractor to
transport students.

It stated:

It seems clear to this court that problems
affecting our schools are matter in which the
public has a legitimate interest and would be
within the rule set forth above.
See Qqden, 551 P.2d 224.

The last case, Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc. 626 P.2d 968 (Utah
1981) provided some insight into the requirements of the "public
interest" privilege.

That case held that it was not a matter of

public interest to make comments upon the possible cruelty to
horses.

It authoritatively stated the requirements for a matter

to be of public interest:
The "public interest" privilege is applicable,
at least, when the public health and safety
are involved and when there is a legitimate
issue with respect to the functioning of
governmental bodies, officials, or public
institutions, or with respect to matters
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involving the expenditure of public funds.
(emphasis added).

The fourth case is Utah State Farm Bureau F. v. National Farm,
198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952).

It held that the "Fair Comment"

doctrine applies to comments and criticism, not mere assertions of
fact.

It stated in its holding that:
Furthermore, to call someone or refer to him
as "communist dominated" is a statement of a
bald and unambiguous fact.
It is not a
criticism or comment on an acknowledged or
accepted fact.

See Utah State Farm Bureau, 198 F.2d at 23.
It is clear that the "Fair Comment" privilege requires three
elements to be shown: (1) It must involve a matter of public
interest; (2) it must be a comment; and (3) it must be based upon
facts that are true.

The article does not meet any of these

requirements.

First, the issue of alleged over-prescription to a nurse for
admittedly legitimate health problems is not an issue of public
interest.

Instead, it enters upon what Newell considered matters

private life and domestic affairs.

It is outrageous to believe

that every nurse taking medication is liable to have that broadcast
throughout her community with no consideration for the truth or her
legitimate concerns of privacy. It does not involve issues of
public health and safety, nor does it implicate a "legitimate issue
with respect to the functioning of governmental bodies, officials,
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or public institutions, or with respect to matters involving the
expenditure of public funds."

Seeqmiller made it clear that these

factors must be included to make it a matter of public interest.

In addition, the claim that dilation and curettages are a
matter of public interest is one not deserving of a response.
These are classic matters of private interest, without the remotest
implication of public safety and health or of governmental bodies.

Second, the matters must be "a comment." The article does not
make fair comments or state opinions; it make bold-faced assertions
of fact.
an addict.

It states that Dr. Brown was causing Ms. Russell to be
It states that Ms. Russell was given four abortions.

It does not draw inferences; it simply makes the assertion that
Mr. Bowen

said

the dilation

& curettage

procedures were

for

abortion.

Utah State Farm Bureau made it clear that it must be a

"comment."

Third, the whole underlying premise for the story is false.
It is essential for the comments, if they even exist in this case,
to be based on legitimate facts.

That is, the inferences and

comments must be founded upon solid, established facts.
case,

In this

the claims of addiction and abortions are false, and not

founded upon legitimate facts.
In sum, the attempt of the defendants to find shelter in the
"Fair

Comment"

privilege

is

entirely
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unfounded

upon

the

requirements of the doctrine.
interest,

The issue is not one of public

the article is not commentary or criticism—it is bad

and false reporting of the facts; its suppositions are false, and
consequently "the privilege must fail."

Finally, the defendants

must still prove that Mr. Bowen made the statement about abortions
for there to no longer be an issue of material fact.

IV. NO IMMUNITY TO REPEAT PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS
This claim is ill-founded.

The defendants attempt to rely on

Section 612 of the Restatement of Torts Second.

However, that

provision is totally inapplicable to them, as the court will
ascertain simply by reading it.

It is a doctrine that protects

transmitters of information, such as phone companies and telegraph
companies.

It certainly has no place in this case.

The section

states:
(1) One who provides a means of publication
of defamatory matter published by another is
privileged to do so if
(a) The other
publish it or

is

privileged

to

(b) The person providing the means
of publication reasonably believes
that the other is privileged to
publish it. (emphasis added)

In

this

case

it

is

clear

that

thte defendants

are

not

providing a means of publishing the defamatory matter, they are
publishing it.
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Furthermore, the defendants' position was

authoritatively

rejected in the Utah case of Utah State Farm Bureau F. v. National
Farm U.S. Corp. , 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952), which held that the
Utah State Farm Bureau was not privileged to repeat defamatory but
privileged statements made by a State Senator on the floor of the
legislature.

It stated:

If the published statement is libelous as a
matter of law, it is no defense that it was
repeated from another source. Restatement of
Law of Torts, Section 578, 580 and 581. It
follows that the appellants can claim no
conditional privilege from a reference to the
Bridges speech if the statement is libelous.
See Utah State Farm Bureau, 198 F.2d at 23.
Finally, it should be pointed out that Mr. Bowen denies making
the statements claimed by the defendants.

They can certainly not

claim a privilege from statements that were not even made by the
allegedly immune person. Clearly, a genuine issue of material fact
remains in this regard.

V.

EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE HAS BEEN SHOWN
The defendants have failed to satisfy the requirements of any

conditional privileges.

However, this case involve the unusual

occasion when evidence of actual malice has been found.
be appropriate
privilege.

to define the malice required

It would

to overcome any

Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc. gives a relevant definition:
The appropriate standard of malice to be
applied to overcome the privilege is "an
improper motive such as a desire to do harm or
that the defendant did not honestly believe
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his statements to be true
publication was excessive.

or

that

the

See Seeamiller, 626 P.2d at 975.

Prosser and Keaton on Torts makes this commentary on
problematic definition of malice in the defamation context:
The word "malice," which has plagued the law
of defamation from the beginning, has been
much used
in this connection, and it
frequently is said that the privilege is
forfeited if the publication is "malicious."
It is clear that this means something more
than the fictitious "legal malice" which is
"implied" as a disguise for strict liability
in any case of unprivileged defamation.
On the other hand, it may mean something less
than spite, ill will, or a desir^ to do harm
for its own sake.(emphasis added)
Perhaps the statement which best fits the
decided cases is that the court will look to
the primary motive or purpose by which the
defendant is apparently inspired. Discarding
"malice"
as
a
meaningless
and
quite
unsatisfactory term, it appears that the
privilege is lost if the publication is not
made primarily for the purpose of furthering
the interest which is entitled to protection.
If the defendant acts chiefly from motives of
ill will, he will certainly be liable; and the
vehemence of his language may be evidence
against him in this respect.(emphasis added)
Finally, since there is no social advantage in
the publication of a deliberate lie, the
privilege is lost if the defendant does not
believe what he says. Many courts have gone
further, and have said that it is lost if the
defamer does not have reasonable grounds, or
"probable cause" to believe it to be true,
(emphasis added)
Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, 833-835 (5th
1984).
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Actual malice is defined in the seminal United States
Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255
280 (1964).

It stated:

The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official
from recovering damages
for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with "actual malice"—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it is false or rnotl.

The Plaintiff has numerous examples of actual malice on the
defendants' part.

First, and most blatant, the article wrongfully

stated that Dr. Brown had performed four abortions on the Plaintiff
within 4-month period.

Mr. Bowen has denied making any such

statements.

Furthermore, even if Ms. Messerly's claims that Mr. Bowen said
those statements are taken as true, she knew personally that the
"abortion" statement was misleading.
II at pages 57-59).

(Messerly Deposition, Vol.

Both she and Mr. Kirkpatrick on behalf of The

Daily Spectrum did not honestly believe the statement to be true
(or to convey the true meaning), and by distorting the meaning of
the D&C procedure, they intentionally allowed the publication to
be run knowing that it was, in this way, excessive.

Under the

standard set in Seegmiller, this element alone would support a
finding of malice and therefore defeat summary judgment.
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The

defendants have in effect admitted to a reckless disregard to the
article's truth or falsity.

In addition, the defendants' mischaracterizes the standard for
summary judgment.

A showing of malice has been made by the

admissions of Kristine Messerly, and the deposition of Mr. Bowen.
It is the rule in summary judgment that questions of fairness or
malice are questions of material fact for the fact finder, prior
to any decision on the points.

Furthermore, the jury should

consider the facts and circumstances of the case in its finding of
malice, rather than relying upon self-serying statements to the
contrary.

VI. A CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY

The defendants attempt to minimize the invasive nature of the
publication of such personal matters of the Plaintiff such as
dilation and curettages, prescriptions, and her professional life.
Apparently only one Utah case deals with the subject of invasion
of privacy, Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 562-566 (Utah 1988), and
it heavily relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section

652A defines the various forms of invasion of privacy as follows:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is
subject to liability for the resulting harm to the
interests of the other.
(2)

The right of privacy is invaded l^y
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another, as stated in Section 652B; or
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(b) appropriation of the other's name
likeness, as stated in section 652C; or

or

(c) unreasonable publicity given to the
other's private life, as stated in Section
652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public, as
stated in Section 652E.

There are four basic

forms of invasion of privacy.

The

plaintiff is relying upon the claim of publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.

It seems

clear that the article published about the Plaintiff's medical
history and professional

problems

falls within

this cause of

action.

In the interest of clarity, the point should be emphasized
that invasion of privacy and defamation are distinct.
protect different interests of the individual.

They each

The action for

defamation protects a person's interest in his good reputation, and
the action for invasion of privacy protects a person's interest in
being let alone.

Therefore, an action for invasion of privacy may

lie where an action for defamation also lies.

See generally

Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, page 864 (5th ed.
1984) .

In this case, the Plaintiff is claiming that the publication
of the article in question by The Daily Spectrum gave unreasonable
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publicity and false light to the Plaintiff'p medical problems and
questions about the prescription of medication to the Plaintiff,
as well as incorrect claims about the dilation and curettage,
including the false claim that they were for abortions.

A.

False Light in the Public Eye

This form of invasion of privacy is caused by showing the
plaintiff in a false light before the public.

In this case, the

defendants put the Plaintiff in a false light before the public by
claiming that she had had four procedures for abortions performed
upon her, when in fact, the procedures were not for abortions.

In

addition, the article's use of the charge^ in the petitions and
stipulations of impairment for drug abuse and addiction were not
accurate, substantiated or admitted.

The article used the charges

to place the Plaintiff in the false light that she had been found
to have been guilty of all the allegations in the petitions, when
in fact the petition had been dismissed with prejudice.

The false light need not be defamatory, although it frequently
is.

It must only be "something that would )pe objectionable to the

ordinary reasonable person under the circumstances.

See generally

Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, page 864 (5th ed.
1984).
It is clear that incorrectly publishing a report that a woman
had had four abortions performed by her employer would be highly
objectionable

by

an ordinary

person under
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the circumstances.

Included in the circumstances must be the morals and mores of the
small community of Ceder City and Southern Utah, where abortions
are viewed with particular vehemence.

Such a false claim must

cause extreme mortification.

In addition, the unproven and unsubstantiated claims that she
had been disciplined and proven to be addicted to medication and
impaired by medication would also be highly objectionable to any
ordinary person under the circumstances.

VII. ACTION FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAN BE HELD

Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) is the
Utah case that sets out the proper elements
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

for the Tort of
These elements are

as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct
toward the plaintiff, with the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress, or
Where any reasonable person would have been known that
such would result, and
His actions are of such a nature as to be considered
outrageous and intolerable
In that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality.

Samms, at 347.
The Samms opinion cites the Restatement of Torts Section 46
as authority for its formulation of the required elements of the
tort.

However, it adds a test for ascertaining the outrageousness
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of the conduct:

Does it "offend against ihe generally accepted

standards of decency and morality."
elements

of

the

Tort

of

Intentional

The required prima facie
Infliction

of

Emotional

Distress summarized as follows:
(1)

Defendant's conduct is outrageous

(2)

It is intended to cause emotional distress

(3)

Severe emotional distress resultsj

(4)

A casual connection exists between defendant's conduct
and plaintiff's distress

See B.Y.U. Journal of Legal Studies, A Summary

of Utah Law:

INTENTIONAL INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, Chap. Ill, pg. 38
(1983).
This section of the analyses of authorities will address each
of these four (4) elements in turn, discussing their requirements
and the applicability of defendants' conduct to the Tort.

A.

Outrageous

Conduct.

Three

general

categories

of

outrageous conduct are usually enumerated: (1) unusually aggravated
circumstances;

(2) abuse of a position of authority;

exploitation of a known vulnerability.

and

(3)

We will show that the

defendants' conduct has entered all three of these categories of
outrageous conduct. See B.Y.U. Journal of Legal Studies, A Summary
of Utah Law:

INTENTIONAL INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, Chap.

Ill, pp. 38-41 (1983).
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i.

Unusually aggravated circumstances may be found in

a variety of forms. It often includes one extremely unconscionable
act of viciousness on the part of the defendant.

For example, the

original case of outrageous conduct, William v. Downton, [1897] 2
Q.B.D. 57, involved the false telling of a man's wife that her
husband had been in a serious accident.

Other cases have included

falsely claiming a person's son had hanged himself, Bielitski v.
Obadiak, [1921] 61 Dom L. Rep. 494, and wrapping a dead rat in an
individual's groceries, instead of bread, Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 D.22 (1930).
distasteful

conduct

that

becomes

Other cases involve

outrageous when

repeated

or

prolonged, including the Samms v. Eccles case, which involved
repeated requests for illicit sex.

Other Utah cases, for example,

Pentecost v. Harward involved a single act of outrageous conduct,
when a residential manager locked a family out of their apartment
during the winter months and retained their belongings as security
for past due rent.
In this case, we will show that the articles claims that the
defendant had had four abortions was outrageous.

In addition, the

unsubstantiated claims of the article that the

ii.

Abuse

of

a Position of Authority

can

give rise to

outrageous conduct if "some relation or position which gives the
defendant

actual or apparent power to damage

interest" is used by the defendant.
42

the plaintiff's

For example, a collection

agency's

use

of

violent

cursing,

abuse

dishonesty was found to be outrageous.

and

accusations

of

See e.g. American Finance

& Loan Corp. v. Coats, 105 Ga. App. 849, 125 S.E. 20 689 (1962);
American Security Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798
(1934); Kirbv v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E.
625 (1936).

In this case, the use of the information in the Petition, as
well as the groundless and unsubstantiated claims set out in more
detail above.

This cause of action provides a remedy for the

individual who is emotionally violated by conduct of another that
is outside of the norms of civilized society.

The use of mass

publication and the statement of baseless falsehoods has caused Ms.
Russell to be emotionally violated, in a way that would shock most
in society.

VIII.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

A.

Summary Judgment:

The Appropriate Standard.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the disposition of a
case if the following three elements are established by a moving
party:
1.

It must be shown that no genuine issue of material

fact exists.
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2.

The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.
3.

This showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all

reasonable possibilities that the losing party could win, if given
a trial.

See Thorn Cook v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Reeves v. Geigy
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Copper
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 90 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23 (1988); Briqqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Thenq v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d

526 (Utah

1979); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1988);
Snyder v. Berkley, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984); Bower v. Riverton City,
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d
40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962); Judkins v. Toore, 27 Utah 2d. 17, 492 P.2d
980 (1972); Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah
221, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. Klien, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978).

B.

Evidence

is Viewed Most Favorably

for the Potential

Loser.
A

court

considering

a

motion

constrained in a number of ways.
admissions and

summary

judgment

is

In particular, "all evidence,

inferences" must be

favorable to the loser."

for

"viewed

in the light most

Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center,
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Utah 201/ 354 P.2d 559, "the party against whom the judgment has
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most
favorable to him."

Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259

P.2d 297 (1953); See Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648
(Utah 1986); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance
Furn. Co. , 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Brigps v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d
281 (Utah Ct, App. 1987); Theng v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d
526 (Utah 1979), or "submission in support of or opposition to a
motion for summary judgment should be looked at in the light
favorable to the non-moving party's position." Durham v. Margetts,
571

P.2d

1332

(Utah

1977);

Salt

Lake

City

Corp.

v.

James

Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

C.

Summary Judgment Should be Invoked Very Reluctantly.

In addition, the remedy of summary judgment should be invoked
very reluctantly, since it denies the non-winning party the chance
to prove its case to the finder of fact.

"Because a summary

judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their case to the
court, courts are and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy,"
Brandt v, Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 20 350, 353 P.2d 460
(1960).
In addition:
Because disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the
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merits, the appellate court must review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing parties, and affirms only where it
appears there is no genuine dispute as to any
material
issues
affect, or were, even
according to the facts as contended by the
losing party, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
See Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn.
Co., 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Theng v. Seagull Enter. Inc., 595 P.2d 526
(Utah 1979).

D.

A

Court

May

Not

Consider Weight

or

Credibility

of

Evidence.
A court may not take into account the weight of evidence as
the credibility of evidence:
The court cannot consider weight of testimony or
credibility of witnesses on a motion for summary
judgment; the court simply determines that there is no
disputed issue of material fact and that as a matter of
law one party should prevail.
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967).

See

also Sandberg v. King, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Spor v. Crested
Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987); W. M. Barnes
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (1981).
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E.

Court May Not Use Summary Judgment to Ascertain What the

Facts Are.
A court may not use summary judgment to ascertain what the
facts actually are in a dispute; it may only examine the evidence,
affidavits,

interrogatories

and

pleadings

to

determine

if

a

material fact issue remains:
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the
facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any
material issues of fact in dispute•
Hill ex rel. Foael v. Grand Cent. Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d
150 (1970).
740 P.2d

See accord Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.,

1309 (Utah 1987); W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural

Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).

F.

Heavy Burden to Establish no Genuine Issue of Material

Fact.
The sufficiency of a controversy as to material fact may be
established by affidavits, answers to interrogation, depositions,
admissions and the pleadings themselves, although allegations in
a pleading are insufficient to rebut an affidavit based on personal
knowledge.

The opposing party must simply show the presence of

some material fact issue that is controverted by affidavit or
discovery?
In order for a non-moving party to oppose successfully
a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a
fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove
its legal theory; it is only necessary for non-moving
party to show "facts" controverting the facts stated in
moving party's affidavit.
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Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
This

threshold

standard

has

been

explained

in

the

following manner:
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments
on other side of controversy and create issues of facts
precluding summary judgment.
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
The threshold standard for summary judgment has been
articulated in a number of ways.

It is, however, clearly a

difficult standard to attain:
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted if the
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint stand in
opposition to the averments of the affidavits so that
there are controverted issues of fact, the determination
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the
parties.
Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d
101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963) .
"The presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows
the granting of summary judgment."

Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v.

Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).

"Unless there is a showing that the disfavored parties
cannot produce evidence that would reasonably support a finding in
their favor on a material or determinate issue of fact, a summary
judgment is erroneous."

Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353

P.2d 909 (1980).
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It must appear to a certainty [emphasis added] that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim
before a judgment on the pleading may be granted.
Security Credit Corp. v. Willy, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953).
A summary judgment must be supported by evidence,
admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"; such
showing must preclude all reasonable possibilities that
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor.
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 201, 354 P.2d
559 (1960).
Such showing [no genuine issue of material fact] must
preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibilities that the losing par^y could win if given
a trial.
Frederick May & Co. v. Dun, 13 Utah 2d. 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962);
Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d. 492 P.2d 98 (1972).
Summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear
from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot
prevail.
Conder v. D. L. Williams & Assoc, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. Ap.
1987); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah Ct.
App 1987) .
The above quotations

and references

illustrate the

difficult burden needed to be shown on summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The Court will readily discover that the statements relied
upon by the defendants to provide them a safe-haven to libel
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private individuals were never made by the state, and it is
impossible to sustain the lower court's order granting summary
judgment.

In

addition,

the

other

various

and

imaginative

privileges being reached for by the defendant are simply not
applicable. Finally, the causes of action for invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are sustainable
both because their elements have been satisfied, but they are also
sustainable because of these causes provide a remedy for the
different interests being damaged by terrible and cruel statements
presented to the Plaintiff's entire community.

There must be a

remedy for this kind of conduct.
Accordingly, the court should reverse the trial court's order
granting summary judgment, and find that the Plaintiff is entitled
to relief as a matter of law.

DATED this 18th day of January, 1991

B. R&Y ZOJiL
tffc

'*-n

j

Attorney for th4
Shelley Russell!
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jUJi
^)

Plathtiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that 4 tr^ie and correct copies
of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
18th day of January, 1991 to Randy Dryer, 185 South State,
Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 8411!
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DIVISION OP REGISTRATION
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Fourth Floor
Heber H. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF
SHELLEY L. RUSSELL
TO PRACTICE AS A
REGISTERED NURSE
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

P E T I T I O N
CASE NO. RG-84-83

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
These causes of action were investigated by the Utah Division of
Registration (the Division) upon complaints that RUSSELL, a licensee of the
Division, has engaged in acts and practices which constitute violations of the
Utah Nurse Practice Act, Utah Code Ann-, Chapter 58-31.

PARTIES
1.

The D i v i s i o n i s a D i v i s i o n of t h e Department ot

Business

R e g u l a t i o n s of the S t a t e of Utah, e s t a b l i s h e d by v i r t u e of S e c t i o n 5 8 - 1 - 1 of
t h e Utah Code.
2.

SHELLEY L. RUSSELL i s a l i c e n s e e of t h e D i v i s i o n .
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
3.

a.

On or about February to April* 1984, RUSSELL received

administrations and prescriptions for controlled substances from several
physicians without making each aware of the controlled substance she was
receiving from the others.
b.

On or about March 17, 19849 RUSSELL misrepresented the

results of past endoscopic tests in an effort to obtain controlled substances.
c.

On or about February to August, 1984, RUSSELL was impaired

because of drug dependence.

COUNT I
4.

The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the

allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out
herein.
5.

Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code provides that the Division

may revoke a license if the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
6.

Section IV C-15

of the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses

defines unprofessional conduct to include violating state or federal drug laws.
7.

Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code provides it to be a

violation to procure or attempt to procure controlled substances by
misrepresentation^ deception or subterfuge.
8.

By engaging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph

number 3 above, RUSSELL has violated the provisions of IV C-15 of the Rules of
Conduct Governing Nurses, constituting grounds for the revocation of her
license under the provisions of Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code.

-3-

COUNT II
9.

The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the

allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as if fully set out
herein.
10.

Section 58-31-14(c) of the Utah Code provides that the Division

may revoke or suspend a nurse*s license if the nurse is unfit or incompetent
by reason of negligence, habits such as habitual intemperance, or addiction to
habit-forming drugs*
11.

By engaging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph

number 3, RUSSELL is in violation of the provisions of 58-31-14(c),
constituting grounds for the revocation of her license under the provisions of
Section 58-31-14 of the Act.

WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

That RUSSELL be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the acts

alleged herein*
2.

That by engaging in the above acts, RUSSELL be adjudged and

decreed to have violated the provisions of the Utah Nurse Practice Act.
3.

That an Order be issued revoking the license of SHELLEY L.

RUSSELL to practice as a Registered Nurse.

DATED t h i s

&
W

day of
of
day

X y W ^
v v^^^TZ^Aj^e

. 1984.
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DIVISION OF RSGJJ&f RATION
Utah Departsttfnt of Business Regulation
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STATB OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Oo the

)

Cr+*- day of _ yd'j'pi/It*//

appeared before me

^

h_,

1984, personally

Steven Davit

, the signer

of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

he

executed the

same on behalf of the Division of the Utah Department of Business Regulation.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

T

DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472)
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIHAN (#2891)
Assistant Attorney General
Division Chief
NEAL T. GOOCH (#1216)

Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Division
Room 130 State Capitol
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5319
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION
STATE OF DTAH
IN THE KATTER OF THE LICENSE
OF SHELLEY L. RUSSELL TO
PRACTICE AS A REGISTERED
NURSE IN THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)

STIPULATION
Case No. RG-84-83

The Division of Registration of the Department of
Business Regulation of the State of Utah ("Division"), by and
through i t s attorney, Neal T. Gooch, Assistant Attorney General,
md Shelley L. Russell ("Respondent"), licensee o£ the Division,
:hrough her a t t o r n e y , B. Ray Zoll, hereby s t i p u l a t e and agree as
follows:
STIPULATION
1.

Respondent i s duly licensed by the State of Utah to

>ractice as a registered nurse.
2.

Pursuant to formal complaint, the Division i n i t i a t -

d an i n v e s t i g a t i o n as provided in Utah Code Ann. S 58-1-1 e t
e q . (1953), as amended.

3*

Upon completion of its investigation, the Division

filed a petition alleging that Respondent had violated Utah Code
Ann* SS 58-31-14(b>, 58-37-8(4) (a) (ii) , and Section IV C-15 of
the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses.
4.

Respondent denies the allegations made by the

Division in paragraph 3 and denies any wrongdoing or violation of
law*
5.

Respondent asserts that she enters into this stipu-

lation for the sole purpose of resolving the matter before the
Division, and by so doing makes no admission as to any violation
of law or the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses, or other wrongdoing either legal or equitable.
6.

Respondent acknowledges that she enters into this

stipulation voluntarily, and that no threat or promise whatsoever
has been made by the Division, or any member of the staff of the
Division or any officer, agent or representative of the Division
to induce her to enter into this stipulation.
7«

Respondent and the Division agree that, upon ap-

proval by the Director of the Division of Registration, this
stipulation shall be a final compromise and settlement of all
counts in the petition filed by the Division in this matter.
However, the Division reserves the right to discipline the Respondent in the event the terms and conditions ot this stipulation are violated or other circumstances come into existence
which warrant discipline.

In the event the Director fails to
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agent during the one-year period provided in paragraph 8c, except
for emergency reasons or exigent circumstances*
f.

In the event she refuses to allow the taking of

blood and/or urine samples, or the samples prove p o s i t i v e for
controlled substances for which Respondent has no legal prescription, Respondent agrees t o the suspension of her l i c e n s e t o
practice as a registered nurse for a period of one year*

The

Issue of whether or not Respondent has refused to allow the
raking of blood and/or urine samples or whether or not the posi:ive t e s t result for controlled substances v i o l a t e s the s t i p u l a tion i s to be determined by the Nursing Board in open hearing
ifter appropriate n o t i c e .
g.

Respondent shall not be treated by Dr. David Brown

or shall Dr. David Brown or his partners prescribe controlled
ubstances for Respondent during the one-year period provided in
aragraph 8c, except for emergency or exigent circumstances.
h.

Emergency reasons and exigent circumstances shall

e defined for purposes of paragraphs 8e and 8g as reasons or
ircuznstances for which no other physician in the community i s
/ a i l a b l e at the time the Respondent requires treatment or the
cescription.

Such reasons or circumstances must be of an

ctraordinary nature and more than a mere request for r e l i e f of
iin.
9.

The Division shall dismiss i t s case against Respon-

tnt with prejudice upon the completion of the one-year period of

-4-

approve t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n , i t w i l l be of no further force and
effect.
8.

Respondent and the Division agree as follows:

a*

Ihe Division shall continue the hearing in t h i s

n a t t e r for an i n d e f i n i t e period.
b.

This stipulation shall not be admitted as evidence

against Dr. David Brown in the case the Division of Registration
brings against Dr. David Brown*
c.

Respondent voluntarily agrees to submit to the

random taking of urine and/or blood upon request by the Division
for a period of one year beginning with the date the order approving the s t i p u l a t i o n in t h i s matter i s signed by the Division.
The samples are not to exceed two in any given month and shall be
taken by a licensed third party, to be agreed upon by the parties.

The taking of urine samples shall be observed by the

igreed upon third party.

The cost of processing the samples

shall be borne by the Division.

The samples shall be taken

f i t h i n four hours of the request of the Division.
d.

Respondent shall provide a telephone number or

lumbers at which she can be reached during the hours of eight
> , clock (8:00) a.m. "and five o'clock (5:00) p.m. on a daily
>asis.

She shall also keep her mailing address current with the

division.
e.

Respondent shall not refuse to allow the taking of

>lood and/or urine samples by the Division or the D i v i s i o n ' s

-3-

paragraph 8c# provided Respondent's samples of blood and/or urine
remain free of controlled substances for which she has no l e g a l
prescription.
10.

Respondent's l i c e n s e to practice as a registered

lurse shall remain in f u l l force and effect, conditioned only as
provided herein*
DATED t h i s / ^

.

%

day of *ft£3n 1985.

SHELLEY V. RUSSELL
Respondent

B.
Attorney Cor Respondent

ROBERT 0. BOWEN, Director
Division of Registration

NEAL T. GOOCH, Assistant Attorney
General, Counsel for Division
of Registration
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statement that might have been made in that?
A

I don't.

Q

Could you read number 16, please.

A

"Brown is recorded to have performed dialation and

curettage —

I'm not sure how you say it —

procedures four

times from April, 1982 to August, 1983 on Russell, the record
says."
Q

Do you recall making any statement to that effect?

A

No.

Q

Do you recall a dialation, ^nd I believe it's

curettage, do you recall any discussibn in relation to
dialation and curettage at all?
A

I recall that I did not know the meaning of those

words.
Q

Have you ever heard those words before to the best

of your recollection?
A

Only when I first read the petition, and I didn't

pay attention to them enough then, but I really didn't know,
I had heard the word curettment and l| wasn't sure it derived
what they were, I didn't know what thby were.
Q

You mean at the time of thej discussion with Ms.

Messerly?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you know what those wordls mean?

A

I do.

56
1
2

Q

Can you tell me what they mean as best you

understand them at this time?

3

A

Well, I think it has something to do with the,

4

again, Ifm not very specific on that, but a cleansing of a

5

lady's vaginal tract or whatever, I'm not sure really still.

6
7

Q
that was?

8
9
10

A

No, I don't really, other than ^he made some

statements about it.

I think her mother was a nurse, and she

had to explain to it to me, but I did not know at that time,

11
12

Do you recall who told you what it meant and when

Q

Okay.

Now, you said she explained it to you, you

mean Ms. Messerly?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Tell me to the best of your recollection what she

15

said about a dialation and curettage.

16

A

Well, I was struggling somewhat with those words as

17

we were going over the petition and we used the words.

£nd if

18

my memory serves me correctly she said, and that's abortion,

19

and I says, well, I don't know, is it, and she says, yes, it

20

is.

21

Q

22

indicated?

23

A

Nothing beyond that.

24

Q

Had you ever heard the words or initials D. and C.

25

What was your response, other than what you've just

before other than in connection with the doctor?

57
Yes, I had, and I did not, I didn't know that it

1

A

2

meant that.

3

Q

4

I had heard it in female jargon, yes.

But at the time of your conversation with Ms.

Messerly you didn't associate the two?

5

A

I didn't.

6

Q

Do you recall any other discussions or statements

7

made by you or by Ms. Messerly in relation to the dialation

8

and cure ttage on Ms. Russell in that conversation?

9

A

No.

10

Q

So you've told us essentially all that you can

11

remember that was discussed?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

For the record could you read 17 and 18, please.

14

A

"That number of procedures in that period of time

1

15

were not medically indicated,"

16

quotes," the charges state."

17

what that procedure was Bowen said, it's for abortion."

that statement is in

And then paragraph, "When asked

18

Q

And it's for abortion is in quotes?

19

A

It's in quotes.

20

Q

So you don't recall it that way, you recall it the

21

way you just told us; is that correct?

22

A

That's correct.

23

Q

Could you read number 19, please.

24

A

"In addition Brown allegedly failed to use, 'timely,

25

i

proper i ntervention in —

now we've got a quote within a

j

DEPOSITION OF KRISTINE MESSERLY IS NOT AVAILABLE.
WILL APPEAR UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

15-2-2

NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO BROAUUAOiiJNijr

r slander, within three days after learning of the
iistake or within three days after service upon the
erson broadcasting that libel or slander, by the
arty aggrieved, of a written notice specifying the
tatement alleged to be erroneous or, in case such
otice is not served, in the manner and within the
ime above specified after the filing of the complaint
nd service of the summons in said action, then the
laintiff shall recover only actual damages
v2) This section shall not apply in the case of any
bel or slander against any candidate for a public
Sice at any general or pnmary election, or any
vowed candidate for nomination to any office before
ny political convention, unless the retraction of the
large was made in the same manner as provided for
ther retractions imder this section within 24 hours
f the time the person broadcasting that libel or slaner became aware of the mistake, but in no case later
ran three days before the holding of such general or
nmary election or political convention A written
jxt of the retraction shall be made available to the
indidate immediately after it has been broadcast,
his retraction shall be m lieu of any other retraction
erem provided
for
IVJS

5-2-2. Libel and slander defined.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Liber means a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing or by signs or pictures
or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity,
virtue or reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule
(2) "Slander" means any libel communicated
by spoken words
1975
5-2-3.

Privileged publication or broadcast defined.
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall
3t be considered as libelous or slanderous per ^ is
le made
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or an>
statement made in any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a
person interested therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to
the pet son interested as to afford a reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give the information
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice
of a judicial, legislative, or other public official
proceeding, or of anything said in the course
thereof i>r of a charge or complaint made by any
person to a public official, upon which a warrant
shall have been issued or an arrest made
(5) By a fair and true report, without malice
of the proceedings of a public meeting if such
meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or the publication or
broadcast of the matter complained of was for the
public benefit.
1975
>-2-4. Malice not inferred from publication.
In the cases provided for in Subsections (3), <4) and
) of the preceding section, malice is not inferred
om the communication or publication
1953
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45-2-5. Radio or television broadcasting station
or network of stations.
No person, firm, or corporation owning or operating
a radio or television broadcasting station or network
of stations shall be liable under the laws of libel, slander or defamation on account of having made its
broadcasting facilities or network available to any
person, whether a candidate for public office or any
other person, or on account of having originated or
broadcast a program for discussion of controversial or
any other subjects, in the absence of proof of actual
malice on the part of such owner or operator In no
event, however, shall any such owner or operator be
held liable for any damages for any defaniatory statement uttered over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public office
ISM
45-2-6.

Right of station to require submission of
matter intended to be broadcast.
Any person, firm, or corporation owning or operating a radio or television broadcasting station shall
have the right, but shall not be compelled, to require
the submission and permanent filing, in such station,
of a copy of the complete address, script, or other form
of expression, intended to be broadcast over such station before the time of the intended broadcast thereof
1M3

45-2-7.

Limitations and restrictions — Immune
from liability — Due care.
Except as provided in Section 45-2-1 5» nothing in
this act contained shall be construed to relieve any
person broadcasting over a radio or television station
from liability under the law of libel, slander, or defamation Nor shall anything else in this act be construed to relieve any person, firm, or corporation
owning or operating a radio or television broadcasting station or network from liability under the law of
libel slander or defamation on account of any broad
cast prepared or made by any such person, firm, or
corporation or by any officer or employee thereof in
the course of his employment In no event, however
shall any such person, firm or corporation be liable
for my damages for any defamatory statement or <Kt
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or
bound broadcast unless it shall be alleged and proved
hv the complaining party that such person firm or
corporation has failed to exercise due care to prevent
the publication or utterance of such statement or id
in such broadcast Bona fide compliance with any fed
eral law or the regulation of any federal regulatory
igencv shall be deemed to constitute such due care as
hereinabove mentioned
1973
45-2-8. Liability in case of joint operation.
In any case where liability shall exist on account of
any broadcast where two or more broadcasting or
television stations were connected together simulta
neously or by transcription, film, metal tape, or other
approved or adapted use for joint operation, in the
making of such broadcast such liability shall be con
fined and limited solely to tne person, firm, or corporation owning or operating the radio or television hta
tion which originated such broadcast
i»»3
45-2-9.

Repealed.

i953

45-2-10. Privileged broadcasts.
\ privileged broadcast which shall not} be considered as libelous, slanderous, or defamatory per se, is
one made
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty

Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 55. D e f a u l t
(a) D e f a u l t
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default
(2) Notice to party in d e f a u l t After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(l> of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58Aid) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaultmg party
tb) J u d g m e n t Judgment by default may be entered as follows
d) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person
(2) By the c o u r t In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor If, m order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper
<c) Setting aside d e f a u l t For good cause shown
the court mav set aside an entry of default and if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)
(d) Plaintiffs, coun terclaiman ts, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default 13 a plain
tiff, a third-party plaintiff or a party who has pleaded
a cross claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54»c
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985 )
Rule 56. Summary j u d g m e n t
(a) For c l a i m a n t A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac
tion or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought mav, at any time
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum
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mary judgment in his favor as to ill or «nw ~thereof
' **
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The m*
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the hn^
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to »hday of hearing may serve opposing] affidavit* THe
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if th*
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator**
and admissions on file, together with the affidav iu s
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anr
material fact and that the moving party is entitled u
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on ib»
issue of liability alone although there is a genuw*
issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If <*
motion under this rule judgment is nop rendered upoo
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial t«
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion by
examining the pleadings and the evidence befor« a
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable **
certain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually »n«J
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon maka
an order specifying the facts that appear without *ub*
stantial controversy, including the extent to whtcb
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro.
versy and directing such further proceedings in tInaction as are just Upon the trial of the action th»
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and th#
trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavit*
shall be made on personal knowledge shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence w l
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compel* nt
to testily to the matters stated therein Sworn or iw
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof reterivd i
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or s»iv«l
therewith The court may permit affidav its to lw -upplemented or opposed by depositions answer^ <«< n>
terrogatones, or further alfidavits VVpen a n ot m » »
summary judgment is made ard supported .« p> >
vided in this rule an adverse party may not n *» »ip« M
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading I *»'
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro^ > *< d n
this rule must set forth specific facts showing tb«c
there is a genu'ne issue for trial If he docs not «»
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate ^h ill K
entered against him
if) When affidavits are unavailable. ^h< uld
appear from the affiaavits of a party opposing tt»
motion that he cannot for reasons stated pre t*nt ' v
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition f'"'
court may refuse the application for judgment n " "
order a continuance to permit affidavits <.o v* <
Gained or depositions to be taken or discover <> "
had or may make such other order as is ust
g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should « »P
pear to the satisfaction of the court at anv time th *l
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this m *
ire presented in bad faith or solely for the p'jrp M*
delay, the court <*hall forthwith orde^ the pirtv *»'
ploying them to pay to the other party the amoun
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the ii'l(
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable »tio
ney s lees, and any ofiending party or attornev t° *
be adjudged guilty of contempt
Rule 57 Declaratory judgments.
4f
The procedure for ootaming a declarator* J1* {
p
men* pursuant to Chapter n of Title fb I ^

